Jesus

Aquinas also used an argument from contingency (Summa Theol. I,2,3), which is distinct from the first cause argument. He observed that in nature there are things whose existence is contingent, that is, possible for it to be and not to be. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which such things did not in fact exist. Thus, on probabilistic grounds, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If that is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Thus contingent beings are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings, meaning there must exist a Necessary Being for which it is impossible not to exist, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is derived.The argument relies on a sort of modal, probabilistic logic to argue there must have been a time when no contingent beings existed. It also relies on the belief that it is impossible for things to come into being if absolutely nothing was existentially prior, which is the assumption of causality or rationality. It should be noted that the concept of an ontologically necessary being is distinct from that of logical necessity in mathematical or sentential logic.