Lebanon

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Love Hizbullah or hate Hizbullah, Hizbullah has lessons for all Arabs

In the past month, and for some time before that, we have heard just about every possible suggestion about how to deal with Hizbullah: Attack it, degrade it, disarm it, wean it away from its friends in Syria and Iran, engage it politically, bring it into the Lebanese government in a bigger way, pressure it to show its real aims, drive it away from the border, or incorporate its military wing into the Lebanese national armed forces. One piece of advice that has not been heard sufficiently, and that strikes us as eminently sensible and relevant, is to learn from Hizbullah's history and to emulate those aspects of its ways that could help the people of this region live more productive, peaceful lives. Hizbullah didn't suddenly materialize magically on a Persian carpet or a divine edict. The organization methodically built itself up and sharpened its capabilities in all fields over a period of years. The core of its success is its capacity to identify the real needs of its constituents, meet those needs systematically through an efficient network of staff and managers, and not to waste time bragging about the fact in public. Whether you approve or disapprove of Hizbullah, you cannot simply ignore it, or wish it away. Debate about its tactics, goals, values, allies, and place in Lebanon and the region will go on for a long time. Such discussion should not merely parrot the rhetoric and cliches of ideologues who love it or hate it, making it a one-dimensional phenomenon that belies its complex multiple roles. We would suggest, rather, that the enormous physical and political reconstruction demands of Lebanon in the months ahead would benefit from the sort of efficiency, focus, strategic planning, diligence and follow-up that have characterized Hizbullah's efforts in all the fields it has entered. Others in Lebanon have achieved similar success, in fields such as medicine, engineering, the arts, banking and many others. This is not a story of particularly Shiite values or religious motivation. It is a narrative of professionalism and its consequences - of individuals who collectively identify a need, define a goal, plan a strategy and get the job done. Hizbullah happens to be the Lebanese organization that has taken this degree of professionalism to the highest degree of impact on the public - good or bad impact, depending on your perspective. Politically, Hizbullah will be challenged, engaged, opposed and long debated. Organizationally and logistically, it has historic lessons to teach all other Arabs in the country and the region. Those Arabs, including the Lebanese, should be alert enough to recognize the rare capacity for efficacy that Hizbullah has developed, and apply it in those crucial fields of public life and national development that have suffered so much mediocrity in the recent past.

Hizbullah victory an honor to Islamic world: envoy ...

The Lebanese Hizbullah's recent victory over the Zionist regime brought honor to the Islamic world. Pak-Ayeen sent separate messages to Thai Muslim officials and heads of missions of Islamic states in Bangkok on Hizbullah's unprecedented victory in the war in Lebanon. "The resistance of the Lebanese people and unrelenting fight of Hizbullah against the aggressive enemy were main factors in their victory," the envoy said. "The Islamic and Arab world will honor the recent achievements of the Lebanese Islamic resistance," he added. He noted that the popular resistance in Lebanon put an end to the myth of the Zionist army's invincibility widely held in the region and around the world for over a half century. "The resistance was a turning point in the history of the Muslim struggle against the occupying regime of Quds". The diplomat expressed confidence the Islamic world will continue its support for the oppressed Palestinian and Lebanese peoples and opposition to the Zionist regime.

The Failures / Twenty questions

How and why did Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decide to go to war in response to the Hezbollah attack and the abduction of two soldiers on July 12th? Who participated in the decision-making and which criteria were taken into account? Did anyone consider the possibility of holding negotiations with Hezbollah over a prisoner exchange? Was the assessment that the Israeli operation would pressure Hezbollah to release the abducted soldiers, with nothing in return? Why wasn't the event where Hassan Nasrallah spoke bombed the same day? Was the possibility considered? Why was the Vice Premier mocked at the cabinet meeting when he asked about the stages following the military operation? Did Chief of Staff Dan Halutz give political leaders the impression that an air offensive would suffice to achieve the goals of the war (releasing the prisoners, deploying Lebanese forces in the south and disarming Hezbollah)? What did Olmert and Amir Peretz know about the levels of Israeli Army preparedness for a confrontation with Hezbollah before they decided on war? Were they warned of the shortcomings of the army and the home front? Why was the state of alert lifted at the Northern Command on the eve of the Hezbollah attack? What was wrong with the way in which the force reacted to an attack by Hezbollah on July 12th? Why did intelligence fail to locate the hide-out of Hezbollah's leadership? Why was the Army surprised by Hezbollah's anti-ship cruise missiles? And why were the defense (war) systems of its advanced warship turned off during a mission off the Lebanese coast? What intelligence was there on Hezbollah's advanced anti-tank missiles and were tactics developed to counter them? What intelligence was there on the Hezbollah order of battle and was this passed on to the Northern Command? Was the air force ordered to target homes near rocket-launching sites and, as a result, struck civilians in Qana on July 30th? Were restrictions lifted on air force targetting, and did this cause further civilian casualties? How was "Israel" dragged into a halting ground offensive in Lebanon, who ordered it and what were political leadership's aims and considerations? Why was Bint Jbail targeted? Was it a PR exercise? What did we know about Hezbollah forces there? Prior to the decision to go to war, did anyone raise the possibility that Hezbollah would be able to fire 100-200 rockets on a daily basis into the North, for a month? Who was responsible for taking care of the population in the North prior to and during the war? Why was no orderly evacuation prepared? How were reservist units deployed with insufficient logistical support? What did the Prime Minister mean in his speech on August 1st that the achievements in the war were "unprecedented"? Why did Olmert and Peretz decide to expand the ground offensive on Friday - a decision that cost the lives of many and damaged "Israel's" image abroad - just as the Security Council approved the cease-fire resolution?

Hizbullah fighters go to ground as Lebanese army rolls into the south...

Several thousand Lebanese soldiers fanned across the shattered south yesterday in a major step towards cementing the four-day-old ceasefire with "Israel". Tanks, troops and armoured vehicles trundled across temporary bridges spanning the Litani River pressing towards territory vacated by the "Israeli" army. By late afternoon, the United Nations confirmed that more than 1,600 soldiers had deployed along the major eastern and western routes between the Litani and the border. The "Israeli" army said it had "transferred responsibility" for half the ground it captured during the 34-day conflict. In some places, war weary civilians lined the roads, showering the convoy with rice and roaring encouragement. But most simply greeted it with sighs of quiet relief. After a ferocious conflict that claimed 845 Lebanese and 145 "Israeli" lives, Muhammad Ghassanil, 66, said the neatly uniformed troops carried his hopes for peace. "Now this is a political problem. If the politicians work well then the army will be successful," he said. The capital, Beirut, also saw signs of a return to normality. Two commercial flights landed at the national airport, signalling the end of the air blockade imposed when "Israeli" bombers hit the airfield five weeks ago. Scheduled flights are to resume next week. The deployment marks the Lebanese army's first significant presence in the south in almost 40 years. In Tyre, soldiers handed out leaflets warning of the dangers of unexploded ordnance. Hizbullah fighters and officials, who in previous days confidently strolled the southern streets directing traffic and clearing rubble-strewn streets, appeared to have melted away. But the guerrilla group's presence was strongly felt in other ways. The yellow Hizbullah flag fluttered from vehicles on the hilly roads, while in Beirut, men in black fatigues and green berets buried two brothers. "The weapons of faith and piety ... have defeated the world's greatest Satan," Sami Meslemani told mourners for his sons, Hasan and Ali. The deployment was proceeding "perfectly", said battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Walid Borkoche, standing near a column of armoured troop carriers outside Jouiya. "I hope this will be a positive step for the peace process in this area and in the Middle East." His troops would facilitate humanitarian operations and "prevent any other military presence in the area", he said. But on the question of disarming Hizbullah, he replied: "I can't answer that." Lebanese officials said they expected one-third of a 15,000-strong force to deploy by the weekend. "Israel", the US and the UN insist all guerrillas must surrender their weapons and vacate the area south of the Litani. "Anything less would mean that the resolution is not being implemented," said "Israeli" foreign ministry spokesman Mark Regev. But the Hizbullah leadership warns it is "too early" to talk of disarmament and the Lebanese government has agreed not to press the issue. Instead, fighters are expected to remain out of sight and stash their weapons - a tactic many Shia Muslims, who regard the fighters as heroes, agree with. "The Islamic resistance was born in this area. They know our pain," said Mahmoud Kiki, 47, as he watched government soldiers leap from a truck in Shebiye. "They know the secret roads and shortcuts and caves. They can fight "Israel" more effectively," he said.

What the Hell Has Happened To The "Israeli" Army????!

SO WHAT has happened to the "Israeli" army? This question is now being raised not only around the world, but also in "Israel" itself. Clearly, there is a huge gap between the army's boastful arrogance, on which generations of "Israelis" have grown up, and the picture presented by this war. Before the choir of generals utters their expected cries of being stabbed in the back - "The government has shackled our hands! The politicians did not allow the army to win! The political leadership is to blame for everything!" - it is worthwhile to examine this war from a professional military point of view. (It is, perhaps, appropriate to interject at this point a personal remark. Who am I to speak about strategic matters? What am I, a general? Well - I was 16 years old when World War II broke out. I decided then to study military theory in order to be able to follow events. I read a few hundred books - from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz to Liddel-Hart and on. Later, in the 1948 war, I saw the other side of the medal, as a soldier and squad-leader. I have written two books on the war. That does not make me a great strategist, but it does allow me to voice an informed opinion.) The facts speak for themselves: * On the 32nd day of the war, Hizbullah is still standing and fighting. That by itself is a stunning feat: a small guerilla organization, with a few thousand fighters, is standing up to one of the strongest armies in the world and has not been broken after a month of "pulverizing". Since 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan have repeatedly been beaten in wars that were much shorter. As I have already said: if a light-weight boxer is fighting a heavy-weight champion and is still standing in the 12th round, the victory is his - whatever the count of points says. * In the test of results - the only one that counts in war - the strategic and tactical command of Hizbullah is decidedly better than that of our own army. All along, our army's strategy has been primitive, brutal and unsophisticated. * Clearly, Hizbullah has prepared well for this war - while the "Israeli" command has prepared for a quite different war. * On the level of individual fighters, the Hizbullah are not inferior to our soldiers, neither in bravery nor in initiative. THE MAIN guilt for the failure belongs with General Dan Halutz. I say "guilt" and not merely "responsibility", which comes with the job. He is living proof of the fact that an inflated ego and a brutal attitude are not enough to create a competent Chief- of-Staff. The opposite may be true. Halutz gained fame (or notoriety) when he was asked what he feels when he drops a one-ton bomb on a residential quarter and answered: "a slight bang on the wing." He added that afterwards he sleeps well at night. (In the same interview he also called me and my friends "traitors" who should be prosecuted.) Now it is already clear - again, in the test of results - that Dan Halutz is the worst Chief-of-Staff in the annals of the "Israeli" army, a completely incompetent officer for his job. Recently he has changed his blue Air-Force uniform for the green one of the land army. Too late. Halutz started this war with the bluster of an Air-Force officer. He believed that it was possible to crush Hizbullah by aerial bombardment, supplemented by artillery shelling from land and sea. He believed that if he destroyed the towns, neighborhoods, roads and ports of Lebanon, the Lebanese people would rise and compel their government to remove Hizbullah. For a week he killed and devastated, until it became clear to everybody that this method achieves the opposite - strengthens Hizbullah, weakens its opponents within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world and destroys the world-wide sympathy "Israel" enjoyed at the beginning of the war. When he reached this point, Halutz did not know what to do next. For three weeks he sent his soldiers into Lebanon on senseless and hopeless missions, gaining nothing. Even in the battles that were fought in villages right on the border, no significant victories were achieved. After the fourth week, when he was requested to submit a plan to the government, it was unbelievably primitive. If the "enemy" had been a regular army, it would have been a bad plan. Just pushing the enemy back is hardly a strategy at all. But when the other side is a guerilla force, this is simply foolish. It may cause the death of many soldiers, for no practical result. Now he is trying to achieve a token victory, occupying empty space as far from the border as possible, after the UN has already called for an end to the hostilities. (As in almost all previous "Israeli" wars, this call is being ignored, in the hope of snatching some gains at the last moment.) Behind this line, Hizbullah remains intact in their bunkers.

Hizbullah's rocket force

The mainstay of Hezbollah's rocket force are small 122mm artillery rockets known by the generic term "Katyusha". The name - which means "little Katy" in Russian - was coined more than 60 years ago by Soviet Red Army troops who fired them at the invading German army. During World War II the Katyushas' distinctive screech cast a powerful psychological spell over the enemy. In northern Israel today, later versions of the rocket remain crude, yet often effective, weapons.SHORT RANGE Hezbollah's Katyushas are thought to derive mainly from former Soviet and Chinese stockpiles. A typical example is the Soviet BM-21 Grad missile, which was first deployed in 1963 and has a maximum range of about 25km.Because of their lack of a guidance system, Katyushas have the greatest effect when launched in concentrated numbers.Since 2001, Hezbollah is believed to have acquired a number of truck-mounted Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers [MRBL], enabling them to fire such multiple barrages.Images broadcast recently by Hezbollah's TV station appeared to show what the group described as a Ra-ad 1 missile being fired. Military analysts believe this missile was an Iranian-built Shahin I missile, which has a range of about 13km.LONGER RANGE Recent missile strikes on Israel's northern port city of Haifa indicate that Hezbollah may also have acquired longer-range missiles.Most of these are believed to be Iranian-manufactured systems like the Fajr-3, with a 45-km range; the Fajr-5, with a range of some 75km.Some analysts believe that Hezbollah also has the more potent Zelzal-2 which has a claimed range of 200-400km and can be fitted with a 600kg high-explosive warhead. Its solid fuel system means that it can be more easily transported and prepared for firing.Most analysts believe a more realistic range to be about 100km, but this would still bring much of Tel Aviv - Israel's largest population centre - within its range.The impact of more than 300 short-range missiles launched by Hezbollah this week has been felt well beyond the towns and olive groves of northern Israel.After three weeks of an intensive Israeli air campaign in Lebanon, backed in recent days by about 10,000 Israeli troops on the ground, Hezbollah is demonstrating a remarkable resilience.On Wednesday it sent a record number of missiles (231) into Israel, proving that despite the Israeli military's claims of success this Lebanese militia group remains a threat to northern Israel.As long as that threat remains, Israel's military campaign in Lebanon - codenamed Miftza Shinui Kivun or Operation Change of Direction - will be perceived as a failure.So how powerful is Hezbollah's arsenal of rockets and missiles?At the start of hostilities on 12 July Hezbollah had an estimated 13,000 missiles, amassed over the six years since Israel withdrew from Lebanon after its controversial 18-year occupation there.The Israeli government says a large proportion of this arsenal has been destroyed but that may be wishful thinking on its part.Most of these missiles are relatively crude Soviet-designed Katyushas with a range of 25km.Although that restricts their target range to only the northernmost towns and villages in Israel they are having a psychological impact on Israelis since they say Hezbollah is packing them with ball bearings that can shred human tissue from some distance.The Katyushas are easy to operate, easy to hide and easy to resupply.Measuring less than two metres long, they can be concealed in orchards or, say the Israelis, among the civilian population in southern LebanonBut their small size also means their explosive power is far smaller than that of a Scud missile or indeed of an air-to-ground missile.An estimated 19 Israeli civilians have been killed to date while the Lebanese government says more than 900 of their citizens have been killed, many by Israeli airstrikes.Hezbollah is also believed to have a smaller number of longer range Fajr-5 missiles with a range of up to 75km, long enough to hit the West Bank but not enough to hit Tel Aviv.The only missile in Hezbollah's arsenal believed to be powerful enough to reach Israel's commercial capital is the Iranian-made Zelzal-2 with a range of 200km and a huge warhead of 400-600kg.This large missile, which is about eight metres long, is effectively a strategic weapon and Israel has been at pains to destroy any suspected launch sites in Lebanon.Some Israeli military analysts have said that if and when Hezbollah do fire such a weapon it would be a sign of desperation, a last-ditch blow against Israel before it sues for peace.Iranian connectionHezbollah prides itself on being a Lebanese movement, but it also has strong connections to Iran.Instructors from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have spent long periods in Lebanon, notably in the Bekaa Valley, teaching Hezbollah cadres how to use their weaponry. Likewise, Hezbollah fighters have reportedly spent time in Iran undergoing military training.One of the most effective weapons deployed by Hezbollah in this conflict has been the Iranian-made C-802 anti-ship missile. A variant of the Chinese Silkworm missile, one of these was successfully fired at an Israeli warship last month, killing four people onboard and severely damaging the vessel.The Israeli military appears to have been taken by surprise by the attack and now believes that Iranian advisers from the IRGC were present at the launch of the missile.One of Israel's major concerns, which has a bearing on the terms of any UN-brokered ceasefire agreement, is that once the fighting stops then Iran will replenish Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles via Damascus and the Syrian-Lebanese border.So, Israel will likely insist on UN or international monitors being stationed along the 375km (233 mile) border. Ads by:

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Lebanon in Crossfire The brutal aggression on Lebanon that caught most Lebanese off guard and left them shell-shocked for days as bombs rained down on their country relentlessly, has now almost entered its second week. As we begin to absorb the magnanimity of this conflict, it is time to start pondering about the factors that led up to this war. Do we hold Hizbullah accountable for sparking the conflict with the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers or do we abide by the theory that Israel had already made plans to move in on Hizbullah using the capture of its troops merely as a pretext? Can we start an inter-Lebanese dialogue about the aftermath of this war in view of the new internal and regional realities that will emerge when the hostilities stop? The future of Lebanon will be the focus of high-level international discussions in the coming weeks. What should Lebanon's position be on the proposals being suggested? What deal can be brokered that would satisfy the Lebanese government, Hizbullah, Israel … Syria and Iran?

Movies:

Haihat Ya Mahtil

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Television:

The Israel Story

Now we can see this house, The house place in area Israel army said about that "This Area Undercountroll The Army" let me see... So, What do you think the line mean in this picture?! Mean that... what is that?, Fajr-5 Missile, the Rocet which has to destroy ground targets into Israel lands which far 60 or 90 K.M of fire place of the missile, the question is; How could Hizboallah fire the rocet by land Israel has said Undercountroll the army?! it's only one answer "ISRAEL A GREAT LIAR"

Books:

Katyusha Rockets when Hizboallah fired them to Haifa, more than 22165 roctets have been fired by Hizboalla since the war started 7/12.Ads:

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friend web sites:
www.shiaweb.org www.jihadbinaa2006.org www.zolfaghar.com www.ghaliboun.net www.moqawama.org