About Me
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THEMISTOCLES OF ATHENS, continued from opposite column
August of 480 BCE: ARTEMISIUM. The first wave of the giant Persian fleet has made it through a narrow channel between the island of Euboea and the mainland of Greece, establishing a land base from which to invade the mainland near Thermopylae. At the other end of the channel is a major supplying and transportation center for their troops. Xerxes' force is massive and he seems to have an endless supply of people and provisions to continue. I know our best chance to stop the invasion is to cripple his supply routes.
We first encountered the Persians at Aphetae, closer to Thermopylae: I was trying to delay them while we got the island of Euboea evacuated. Xerxes then sent 200 ships around the south of Euboea, hoping to trap us in the channel while we were busy with the first wave. We met the present part of the fleet head on, surrounding them, despite our fewer numbers. My faster, more agile triremes rammed many vessels and we captured over two dozen of their own ships with boarding maneuvers, and moved on toward Artemisium. The remains of this part of the Persian fleet retreated as night was falling and weather was turning bad. The 200 ships they had sent to surprise us around the other side of the island were destroyed in a sudden storm that same night. The next day 53 more Athenian ships arrived and we were able to destroy a few more of the enemy's vessels...but more just kept coming. The Persian resources seemed endless.....
On the third day, word came of the loss of Thermopylae, and we knew that would free up more Persian ships to come our way, and they did: we had them come at us en masse, from all directions, with still superior numbers. I ordered my ships into what was called a kyklos maneuver, for origination of which I am credited:, we formed an inner circle, with our sterns toward one another and our rams pointed outward. It looked to the Persians, I suppose, as if we were cowering together in fear like prey waiting to be devoured, but we were actually coiled up like a snake, ready to strike out in all directions. We all rowed at top speed toward the Persian's surrounding circle, and each one of our rams caught one ship at an angle; that was all that was necessary to start the too-closely packed, too-unsteady in the water enemy ships crashing into one another on the natural momentum occuring from the ram and because as we passed by them after making contact, our rams sheared off the rows on one side of the struck ship, rendering it uncontrollable.
With the fall of Thermopylae, I knew the next place we had to evacuate--and fast--was Athens. While Persia enjoyed their "Victory" at Artemisium by sacking the city, I removed most of Athens to Salamis, saving them from slaughter when the Persians pillaged and burned it to the ground.
But I had to even fight for THAT. Continued resistance to the obvious, continued underestimation of me, and a general smugness of Athenians, necessitated me heatedly and frantically pushing for a decree that would LET ME save these people! Some priests and arrogant citizens remained, but they met a terrible fate by staying in the city.
The decree of Themistocles, evacuating Athens.
September of 480 BCE: SALAMIS. What remained of our fleet was about 250-300 ships; Xerxes' navy had about 500 to spare at Salamis. Still, I was sure that a battle could be fought and won in the narrow straits between the island of Salamis and the Attican coastline, but fearful of the Persian victories on land so far, all the allies were in heated argument about dispersing to their own homelands to defend against the enemy: again, the constant problem of acting as a united Hellenic peoples. I held my ground: we could only defeat the Persians at sea, we were a better navy than they were, I knew it. A Spartan admiral, intent on leaving, even struck me with his staff to shut me up, but I said he could continue striking me all he wished, but he would still have to listen to me as he did so.
I finally obtained the allies' agreement for us to confront Xerxes' fleet again, but I had learned that I could trust no one, especially people in power and people whose cowardice makes them change alliances frequently, so to manipulate the Persians into forcing my fellow Greeks to stay where I wished them to stay, I sent an informer to the Persians to plant the idea that a few of our ships were planning to sail out from Salamis to join the army at Plataea, and the rest of the Greeks, being cowards and uncertain of themselves, planned to escape by night. Xerxes, finding this entirely believable, immediately dispatched the pride of his fleet, the Egyptians and Phoenicians, west around the isthmus, to block our exit to the sea from the north via the Bay of Eleusis while the other half held the exit to the south. To further the ruse, I sent some of my ships northward up the channel at dawn, under sail (which you do not use if you are going into battle--only if you are fleeing or travelling) which looked very much like the "expected" retreat; half of the Persian fleet which remained now hurried to catch them. Thus, I kept my fleet close, I halved the force we immediately faced, and I exhausted any possible reinforcements by forcing them to have rowed all night prior to any possible battle if my plan failed due to my own people's lack of fortitude.
The map is serviceable, but the displayed array of the forces is somewhat inaccurate.
Picture the letter "V" for VICTORY: my ships are now placed in the opposite corners of the top. The Persians think they have half my fleet barricaded at Salamis and half on the run....when in fact, they are stuck in a very tight corner with absolutely no place to go: all that is required is for my "fleeing" ships to turn around and head at the Persians for the whole picture to change. Some of the other commanders in our fleet wanted to strike right away at the enemy, but I insisted, with much argument (always!) that we wait for the naturally occurring increase in the winds in these straits a little later in the morning. The winds changed, and now the pursuing Persians worked against the wind as my "fleeing" ships lowered their sails, turned about, and went into the diekplus ramming mode. The actual numbers of my ships in the bay at Salamis were partially obscured by a natural headlands, and additionally, protected from the wind as they came out into the strait to face the enemy: I kept some hidden until the Persians had turned to attack the others, exposing their vulnerable flanks (an invitation to a periplus surprise party), to those emerging from behind the cliffs.
PERIPLUS, left, a simple outflanking maneuver if you have superior numbers or your enemy's flank is exposed. DIEKPLUS, right, a smaller, more agile force can break the enemy's line with a frontal assault + a "last moment" turn.
We only had to ram a few of their ships in the tight, constricted strait to start them crashing into one another. As soon as the Phoenician general fell, the Phoenicians tried to flee, adding to the confusion and collisions. Of about 250 ships, Xerxes lost 200. I lost 40, and my men could swim.
Detail of The Battle of Salamis by Von Kaulbach
The Persians went home to stay .
Stained Glass version of a painting called "Athena Remembering Themistocles"
I was celebrated everywhere after this decisive victory, even in Sparta, who was always Athens' rival, and this didn't sit too well with my political enemies and social elite (some of whom I had got called back in from ostracisms by getting people to vote on a general amnesty prior to the Persian invasion). They didn't get me ostracized, but they got me removed from my generalship. That didn't stop me from being a vocal annoyance. These idiots were going to sit on their laurels, gloating, for Athens was given credit for saving all Hellas, and our more liberal brand of democracy (still terribly conservative by your standards) was starting to be imitated; I knew that wouldn't sit well with the vain, untrustworthy, oligarchical kingdom of Sparta, and Hellenes always reverted to infighting when there wasn't someone from outside to hate. So yes, I did engage in some clever time-wasting distraction by making an "impromptu" visit to Sparta to keep them occupied (and to enable my men to take hostage some Spartan nobles on a "diplomatic" mission in order to secure my safe departure from Sparta when the ruse was discovered) while my people rebuilt and strengthened the walls around Athens and Piraeus.
In one of the many attempts to form the "Leagues" that pepper Greek history, Sparta was seeking to eliminate any polis which had below a certain number of adult men and had not participated in the Persian Wars. Well, lots of smaller polises had lost many many in the last conflict and we still trying to rebuild their people, let alone their city; and there are many small towns, but small town people are not less worthy--or less Hellene--than big city people. I was very loud and insistent in my protest against this and what it revealed about the character of those who proposed it or agreed with it (many of whom were Athenians). As usual, the little guy loved me, the big guys hated me.
Athens continued to be friendlier--or at least less hostile--to the Spartans some years later, and I took them to task for that, along with being my usual outspoken "radical" self: I was ostracized again, and for the last time around 471 BCE at nearly 60. In a giant F-YOU to Athens, I moved my whole family to Argos, then the enemy flavor of the month, especially in Sparta. Incensed, Sparta pressed Athens about this and constructed elaborate lies about me and treasonous activity, and my enemies in Athens were able to narrowly win a vote to change my sentence of ostracism to a sentence of death! Plutarch, in his "Life of Themistocles" quotes me thus: He said that the Athenians did not honour him or admire him, but made, as it were, a sort of plane-tree of him; sheltered themselves under him in bad weather, and as soon as it was fine, plucked his leaves and cut his branches. (Plutarch uses a variety of sources, some who hate me and some who love me, and makes a thorough, if see-sawing, biography.)
In an elaborate and dangerous flight, assisted by many friends and admirers, I was able to bring all my cherished loved ones safely to Asia Minor: wives, concubines, sons, daughters, their spouses, and my grandchildren. Of all my possessions, they always were my dearest. ("Laughing at his own son, who got his mother, and, by his mother's means, his father also, to indulge him, he told him that he had the most power of any one in Greece: 'For the Athenians command the rest of Greece, I command the Athenians, your mother commands me, and you command your mother.'" Plutarch)
(François, 1832) A very long French title, but it is a painting of myself begging the "king of Molossos" (inaccurate, but it represents someone whom I had defeated in battle) for safe haven for my wives, concubines, and children during my ostracisms from Athens.
I also had the respect of the successor to Xerxes, Artaxerxes, which says a lot of noble things about him and his attitudes, I think. He offered me safe haven in Magnesia if I would accept its governorship. In a giant F-YOU to Greece for all their gratitude and loyalty for my decades of service and sacrifices for them despite their abuses, I accepted refuge and residence in Persia. I died there circa 459 BCE, at almost 70 years of age, by my own hand when the Persian king asked if I would honor him by helping to battle Greece who was rising up against them with Egypt; I was indebted to him for his great kindness and was honored to serve in all ways, but I could not do this thing. Understanding and respecting my difficult choice, the king and my people in Magnesia built a beautiful monument for my tomb after the suicide.
