AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPAMINONDAS OF THEBES, continued from opposite column
his short spear or sword (ziphos) is not shown at his left side
Battles were not as you often see represented in your modern media either: no clash of heroes while others watched. It was ugly, crushing, brutal, mass maneuvers that were often over in much less than an hour: sometimes only minutes. Phalanx warfare was the common way of doing things: a phalanx is a rank and file of soldiers of varying size, usually 8-12 rows or ranks deep, sometimes 16. Greek soldiers are called hoplites, named for the heavy large round shield we carried (a hoplon); we also carried a long spear that was used rather as a porcupine uses its quills, to injure the opponent before actual contact is made, and a short spear to be used if we had to do close infighting. Each man bought his own armor: some could afford more than others, but a fully-outfitted soldier with his weapons, a shield, a cuirass, and perhaps some greaves would be carrying half his body weight in materials that cost perhaps several year's earnings. It's no wonder that spoils from the dead were often more hotly fought over than the conflict itself for some soldiers. Unlike Sparta, we did not have mass-produced, uniform armor and weaponry, nor did we provide full accoutrements to every soldier who could not afford it himself, although I was noted for generously helping to protect and arm those whose means left them less equipped. The Spartans were a well-trained war machine.
First, the units of each side would approach one another, each man's shield protecting most of his left side and part of the next man's right. The long spears protruded in front of us as we began the charge at one another, and some would fall in that first wave or be so bogged down by spears stuck in his shield that it would be rendered cumbersome enough that he would drop it, leaving him vulnerable. Second, the phalanges (plural of phalanx) would crash into one another like a tidal wave of wood and metal, with a deafening, hellish noise, hoping to mow down the opponent so their phalanges would collapse from the force. Third, those who did not fall, get crushed, have their shields knocked away, or run in retreat, would then have to engage in close fighting with the short spears.
Horses were expensive, but it had begun to be apparent that cavalry was advantageous: although they were still mostly used to pick off cowards in retreat when the opposition's ranks broke. We had very few cavalry, however. For that matter, we had very few soldiers as compared to our enemy. From Thebes and the nearby city of Leuctra, I guessed I would have less than 3000 troops and 300 cavalry. But, as Pausanias wrote, and you have no doubt guessed, "the (Spartans may have) had their (greater) experience, and the (fear) of lessening the reputation of Sparta; the Thebans realized that what was at stake was their country, their wives, and their children."
Surprisingly, on my trip back home, a few of the nearby polises under the Spartan thumb declared that they would fight with me: the Orchomenians and Thespians offered to lend the most troops and cavalry. Once home, I began to organize the army and discuss military strategies and the logistics of getting all our wives, little ones, and old ones out of the city to some safer place. I had to pull all of this together with the Spartan army hot on my heels.
detail of the Chigi Vase
One of the Spartan kings, Cleombrotus, led the enemy troops tapped for this war (Sparta was warring in a variety of places, but they had massive numbers to do so). Full of themselves, they stormed and pillaged two cities on their way to Thebes, so I could not catch them in a pass that would have been advantageous for my slightly smaller force. They were coming in so fast and I was trying to co-ordinate battle plans and evacuation plans at the same time....I moved away from Thebes and toward the city of Leuctra to meet the enemy on the large plain there. Almost immediately thereafter, our women, children, and elders came back in the direction we had sent them out: a reinforcement regiment was coming to meet up with Cleombrotus' forces. My 7000 or so were now going to face over 10,000 fully-armored troops, 1100 light-armored troops, and 1000 cavalry...with our loved ones looking on.
The Spartans led by Cleombrotus rolled up to the Leuctra plain; looking us over, he thought we were pretty equally matched. He did not know of the reinforcements on the way, and he hesitated to engage in battle. Intelligence reports told me that he was even thinking of leaving, not expecting me to have the same number of men he did. Surprised next by thundering hooves from an unexpected direction, I was grateful to see over a thousand cavalry coming to join our side: it was King Jason of Thessaly, who had been battling Spartan expansion himself. The Theban cavalry was better trained than the Spartan, and the Thessalian horse troops were known to be the best in the Mediterranean region. Still, I knew what was coming in. And it did later in the day.
I sensed a lack of resolve in some of the troops, and after arguments with the six other generals, when I had been given final command over all, I made an announcement "fearing therefore, lest they should desert during the engagement, (I) Epaminondas permitted all who wished to leave camp (to) go home" (Pausanias). A small, dedicated force, who would not waver, was more valuable than sheer numbers in our dire straits. I asked only that those who would leave do so at night and quietly, and take our families to safety as well. I lost all the Thespians (whose city had been one attacked days earlier) and others totalling about 1000.
a Macedonian or later version of the phalanx when long spears had been replaced with very long pikes
THE DAY ARRIVES. Tradition and superstition makes our armies put their best fighters in the right wing: this includes their most important officers--and their royalty, if they are Spartan. Tradition has the phalanges advancing toward one another in straight rank and file. Light armored troops bookend cavalry and phalanx. The Spartans line up their massive 11,000 in a shallow crescent of phalanges 12 men deep, stretching across the horizon in a swath of scarlet and shields. I put my best fighters in the left wing, including an elite corps of 300 called the Dedicated Band (often translated as "the Sacred Band"), led by my friend Pelopidas; we are about 12 men deep as well, but we have very few sections. All my cavalry is to the left, and while the horse troops skirmish a little prior to battle, distracting the Spartans, I give the signal....
Several of my left wings phalanges immediately stack up as one giant phalanx, 50 men deep, and we run toward the startled Spartans at an oblique angle, cutting through their ranks like a knife, scattering people in erratic ways, disrupting order so essential to phalanx success, causing one group to push into the next at the same oblique angle, and we just kept coming--50 men deep. We plowed through their best and came around from behind at the confused other troops. Their king, some of his relatives, and all the high-ranking officers were killed within a minute of the charge, which killed the morale and resolve of most of the Spartan troops. It seemed chaos to them, but it was just what I had hoped for, and my men trusted me enough to go against all convention. The enemy that wasn't crushed by my massive phalanx or the crush of their own brethren or grievously wounded in the first moments fled back toward their camp: but it was an uphill run, which tired them more quickly, and my cavalry harried and killed many of them. The whole right half of my army saw no action at all! Over 500 enemy were killed in the first minutes of battle and that many were also killed in retreat. Figures vary, but my casualties may have been as low as 47.
Example showing the Oblique Phalanx, for perfection of which I am accurately credited, as opposed to the Traditional Phalanx
I did not take any slaves, I did not take any prisoners, I did not let my men collect booty from the fallen enemy, and only after I had collected and buried my dead, did I allow the Spartans and their allies who remained at Leuctra to collect their dead. (Why the delay? See the blog SPARTAN BULLSHIT)
Historian Xenophon was a contemporary, but he had no great love for Thebes, and in his Hellenica (Book VI, Chapter IV) he makes a lot of excuses for Spartan failure, ranging from the inability to hear commands that would have stopped our unconventional attack to drunkenness of the Laconian forces. Being a soldier himself, he knew better: hearing and seeing once the battle was engaged was always nearly impossible due to the noise, the chaos, and the limited hearing and visibility created by the helmets. And soldiers always had a late breakfast, that included wine, before the battle, as a celebration of camaraderie with friends who might be lost, and to steel their nerves and numb the pain for what was coming. The fact is, the Spartans may have been the Unstoppable Force, but they had no flexibility or imagination, and their assembly-line approach to war was passionless compared to ours. I counted on the unwavering loyalty and trust in my tactics of my men, and I chose good officers and arrayed them throughout my host. Spartan overconfidence was also a factor. Every contest was an important one to me: I never took death and killing lightly, though it was a regular affair.
From 370 to 369 BCE, I led campaigns into the Peloponnese region, the Laconian homeland, and freed Arcadia and Messenia from the Spartan yoke (the Spartans called it a "confederacy," but it was subjugation). In 367 BCE, there was a battle in which we took hostages in order to replenish our treasury, as was a common practice. One of them was a youth of 15, son of a Macedonian king, who bore his father's name, Philip. We were not unkind to our hostages, and in fact, I knew this eager, energetic, intelligent teenager personally and he idolized me.
In 366 BCE, with Spartan hegemony unquestionably in ruins, the "Athenian League" attempted to rise again and be the new bully on the block. Athens was known for its naval prowess, but I took them on at sea, meeting them in Byzantium and checking their progress. In 362, an angry coalition of Athenians and Spartans met me and my allies at Mantinea. I was mortally wounded by a javelin in that battle. I knew that removing the iron head would hasten my death, but knowing the great emotional significance generals had for their men, I fought .. removing the wooden handle, until copious blood loss saw me falling amongst my men as we won the day.
"The Deathbed of Epaminondas" detail; pretty colours, but wholly inaccurate as I fought on the field till I died
I died unconquered by disadvantages of birth, life, and other struggles. I faced the odds, often against me, and prevailed through belief in myself, intelligence, creative thinking, and strong moral courage.
Although the day was won, at Mantinea, much was lost. The Boeotian people could not find another Epaminondas, and my campaigns against Athens, Sparta, and their allies had left them in disarray as well. Less than three years later, that young protegé of mine for a short while, now Philip II of Macedonia, would overtake all Hellas and begin an even greater expansion of his empire, building on tactics he learned from me---with his young son, later known as Alexander the Great, at his side.
Ben Hur - The Chariot Race
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbQvpJsTvxU
